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Determinism is a rich and varied concept. At an abstract level of analysis, Jordan Howard 
Sobel (1998) identifies at least ninety varieties of what determinism could be like. When it 
comes to thinking about what deterministic laws and theories in physical sciences might be 
like, the situation is much clearer. There is a criterion by which to judge whether a law–
expressed as some form of equation–is deterministic. A theory would then be deterministic 
just in case all its laws taken as a whole were deterministic. In contrast, if a law fails this 
criterion, then it is indeterministic and any theory whose laws taken as a whole fail this 
criterion must also be indeterministic. Although it is widely believed that classical physics is 
deterministic and quantum mechanics is indeterministic, application of this criterion yields 
some surprises for these standard judgments. 
 
Framework for Physical Theories 
Laws and theories in physics are formulated in terms of dynamical or evolution equations. 
These equations are taken to describe the change in time of the relevant variables 
characterizing the system in question. Additionally, a complete specification of the initial 
state referred to as the initial conditions for the system and/or a characterization of the 
boundaries for the system known as the boundary conditions must also be given. A state is 
taken to be a description of the values of the variables characterizing the system at some time 
t. As a simple example of a classical model, consider a cannon firing a ball. The initial 
conditions would be the initial position and velocity of the ball as it left the mouth of the 
cannon. The evolution equation plus these initial conditions would then describe the path of 
the ball. 
 Much of the analysis of physical systems takes place in what is called state space, an 
abstract mathematical space composed of the variables required to fully specify the state of a 
system. Each point in this space then represents a possible state of the system at a particular 
time t through the values these variables take on at t. For example, in many typical dynamical 
models–constructed to satisfy the laws of a given theory–the position and momentum serve 
as the coordinates, so the model can be studied in state space by following its trajectory from 
the initial state ( qo, po) to some final state ( qf, pf). The evolution equations govern the path–
the history of state transitions–of the system in state space. 
 However, note that there are important assumptions being made here. Namely, that a 
state of a system is characterized by the values of the crucial variables and that a physical 
state corresponds to a point in state space through these values. This cluster of assumptions 
can be called the faithful model assumption. This assumption allows one to develop 
mathematical models for the evolution of these points in state space and such models are 
taken to represent (perhaps through a complicated relation) the physical systems of interest. 
In other words, one assumes that one’s mathematical models are faithful representations of 
physical systems and that the state space is a faithful representation of the space of physically 
genuine possibilities for the system in question. Hence, one has the connection between 
physical systems and their laws and models, provided the latter are faithful. It then remains to 
  
determine whether these laws and models are deterministic or not. 
 
Laplacean Determinism 
Clocks, cannon balls fired from cannons and the solar system are taken to be paradigm 
examples of deterministic systems in classical physics. In the practice of physics, one is able 
to give a very general and precise description of deterministic systems. For definiteness the 
focus here is on classical particle mechanics, the inspiration for Pierre Simon Laplace’s 
famous description:  
 
We ought to regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its antecedent state 
and as the cause of the state that is to follow. An intelligence knowing all the forces 
acting in nature at a given instant, as well as the momentary positions of all things in 
the universe, would be able to comprehend in one single formula the motions of the 
largest bodies as well as the lightest atoms in the world...to it nothing would be 
uncertain, the future as well as the past would be present to its eyes.(translation from 
Ernst Nagel 1961, pp. 281-282) 
 
Given all the forces acting on the particles composing the universe along with their exact 
positions and momenta, then the future behavior of these particles is, in principle, completely 
determined. 
 Two historical remarks are in order here. First, Laplace’s primary aim in this famous 
passage was to contrast the concepts of probability and certainty. Second, Gottfried Wilhelm 
Leibniz (1924, p. 129) articulated this same notion of inevitability in terms of particle 
dynamics long before Laplace. Nevertheless, it was the vision that Laplace articulated that 
has become a paradigm example for determinism in physical theories. 
 This vision may be articulated in the modern framework as follows. Suppose that the 
physical state of a system is characterized by the values of the positions and momenta of all 
the particles composing the system at some time t. Furthermore, suppose that a physical state 
corresponds to a point in state space (invoking the faithful model assumption). One can then 
develop deterministic mathematical models for the evolution of these points in state space. 
Some have thought that the key feature characterizing this determinism was that given a 
specification of the initial state of a system and the evolution equations governing its states, 
in principle it should be possible to predict the behavior of the system for any time (recall 
Laplace’s contrast between certainty and probability). Although prima facie plausible, such a 
condition is neither necessary nor sufficient for a deterministic law because the relationship 
of predictability to determinism is far too weak and subtle. 
 Rather, the core feature of determinism is the following condition: 
 
Unique Evolution: A given state is always followed (and preceded) by the same 
history of state transitions. 
 
This condition expresses the Laplacean belief that systems described by classical particle 
mechanics will repeat their behaviors exactly if the same initial and boundary conditions are 
specified. For example the equations of motion for a frictionless pendulum will produce the 
same solution for the motion as long as the same initial velocity and initial position are 
chosen. Roughly speaking, the idea is that every time one returns the mathematical model to 
the same initial state (or any state in the history of state transitions), it will undergo the same 
  
history of transitions from state to state and likewise for the target system. In other words the 
evolution will be unique given a specification of initial and boundary conditions. Note that as 
formulated, unique evolution expresses state transitions in both directions (future and past). It 
can easily be recast to allow for unidirectional state transitions (future only or past only) if 
desired. 
 
Unique Evolution 
Unique evolution is the core of the Laplacean vision for determinism (it lies at the core of 
Leibniz’s statement as well). Although a strong requirement, it is important if determinism is 
to be meaningfully applied to laws and theories. Imagine a typical physical system s as a film. 
Satisfying unique evolution means that if the film is started over and over at the same frame 
(returning the system to the same initial state), then s will repeat every detail of its total 
history over and over again and identical copies of the film would produce the same sequence 
of pictures. So if one always starts Jurassic Park at the beginning frame, it plays the same. 
The tyrannosaurus as antihero always saves the day. No new frames are added to the movie. 
Furthermore, if one were to start with a different frame, say a frame at the middle of the 
movie, there is still a unique sequence of frames. 
 By way of contrast, suppose that returning s to the same initial state produced a 
different sequence of state transitions on some of the runs. Consider a system s to be like a 
device that spontaneously generates a different sequence of pictures on some occasions when 
starting from the same initial picture. Imagine further that such a system has the property that 
simply by choosing to start with any picture normally appearing in the sequence, sometimes 
the chosen picture is not followed by the usual sequence of pictures. Or imagine that some 
pictures often do not appear in the sequence, or that new ones are added from time to time. 
Such a system would fail to satisfy unique evolution and would not qualify as deterministic. 
 More formally, one can define unique evolution in the following way. Let S stand for 
the collection of all systems sharing the same set L of physical laws and suppose that P is the 
set of relevant physical properties for specifying the time evolution of a system described by 
L: 
 
A system s 0 S exhibits unique evolution if and only if every system sN0 S 
isomorphic to s with respect to P undergoes the same evolution as s. 
 
 
Two Construals of Unique Evolution 
Abstracting from the context of physical theories for the moment, unique evolution can be 
given two construals. The first construal is as a statement of causal determinism, that every 
event is causally determined by an event taking place at some antecedent time or times. This 
reading of unique evolution fits nicely with how a number of philosophers conceive of 
metaphysical, physical and psychological determinism as theses about the determination of 
events in causal chains, where there is a flow from cause to effect, if you will, that may be 
continuous or have gaps. The second construal of unique evolution is as a statement of 
difference determinism characterized by William James as “[t]he whole is in each and every 
part, and welds it with the rest into an absolute unity, an iron block, in which there can be no 
equivocation or shadow of turning”(1956, p. 150). This reading of unique evolution 
maintains that a difference at any time requires a difference at every time. 
 These two construals of unique evolution are different. For example, consider a fast-
  
starting series of causally linked states (Sobel 1998, p. 89), where every state in the series has 
an earlier determining cause, but the series itself has no antecedent deterministic cause (its 
beginning–the first state–is undetermined by prior events or may have a probabilistic cause) 
and no state in the series occurs before a specified time. The principle that every event has an 
earlier cause would fail for a fast-starting series as a whole though it would hold for the 
events within such a series. This would be an example where causal determinism failed, but 
where difference determinism would still hold. 
 However, the causal construal of unique evolution is unsatisfactory. Concepts like 
event or causation are vague and controversial. One might suggest explicating causal 
determinism in terms of the laws L and properties P, but concepts like event and cause are not 
used in most physical theories (at least not univocally). In contrast, unique evolution fits the 
idea of difference determinism: any difference between s and sN is reflected by different 
histories of state transitions. This latter construal of unique evolution only requires the normal 
machinery of the theoretical framework sketched earlier in order to cash out these differences 
and so avoids controversies associated with causal determinism. 
 
Determinism in Classical Mechanics 
Most philosophers take classical mechanics to be the archetype of a deterministic theory. 
Prima facie Newton’s laws satisfy unique evolution (see Newtonian Mechanics). After all, 
these are ordinary differential equations and one has uniqueness and existence proofs for 
them. Furthermore, there is at least some empirical evidence that macroscopic objects behave 
approximately as these laws describe. Still, there are some surprises and controversy 
regarding the judgment that classical mechanics is a deterministic theory. 
 For example, as Keith Hutchinson (1993, p. 320) notes, if the force function varies as 
the square root of the velocity, then a specification of the initial position and velocity of a 
particle does not fix a unique evolution of the particle in state space (indeed, the particle can 
sit stationary for an arbitrary length of time and then spontaneously begin to move). Hence, 
such a force law is not deterministic. There are a number of such force functions consistent 
with Newton’s laws, but that fail to satisfy unique evolution. Therefore, the judgment that 
classical mechanics is a deterministic theory is false. 
 
Newtonian Gravity. One might think that the set of force functions leading to violations of 
unique evolution represents an unrealistic set so that all force laws of classical mechanics 
really are deterministic. However, worries for determinism await one even in the case of 
point particles interacting under Isaac Newton’s force of gravity, the paradigm case of 
determinism that Laplace had in mind. 
 In 1897 the French mathematician Paul Painlevé conjectured that a system of point-
particles interacting only under Newton’s force of gravity could all accelerate to spatial 
infinity within a finite time interval. (The source of the energy needed for this acceleration is 
the infinite potential well associated with the inverse-square law of gravitation.) If particles 
could disappear to ‘spatial infinity,’ then unique evolution would break down because 
solutions to the equations of motion no longer would be guaranteed to exist. Painlevé’s 
conjecture was proven by Zhihong Xia (1992) for a system of  five point-masses. 
 Though provocative, these results are not without controversy. For example, there are 
two interesting possibilities for interpreting the status of these particles that have flown off to 
spatial infinity. On the one hand, one could say the particles have left the universe and now 
has some indefinite properties. On the other hand, one could say that the particles no longer 
  
exists. Newton’s mechanics is silent on this interpretive question. Furthermore, are events 
such as leaving the universe to be taken as predictions of Newton’s gravitational theory of 
point particles, or as indications that the theory is breaking down because particle position 
becomes undefined? Perhaps such behavior is an artifact of a spatially infinite universe. If the 
universe is finite, particle positions are always bounded and such violations of unique 
evolution are not possible. 
 
Diagnosis. Other failures of unique evolution in classical mechanics can be found in John 
Earman’s (1986) survey. What is one to say, then, about the uniqueness and existence 
theorems for the equations of motion, the theorems that appear so suggestive of unique 
evolution? The root problem of these failures to satisfy unique evolution can be traced back 
to the fact that one’s mathematical theorems only guarantee existence and uniqueness locally 
in time. This means that the equations of motion only have unique solutions for some interval 
of time. This interval might be short and, as time goes on, the interval of time for which such 
solutions exist might get shorter or even shrink to zero in such a way that after some period 
solutions cease to exist. So determinism might hold locally, but this does not guarantee 
determinism must hold globally. 
 
Determinism in Special and General Relativity 
Special relativity provides a much more hospitable environment for determinism. This is 
primarily due to two features of the theory: (1) no process or signal can travel faster than the 
speed of light, and (2) the spacetime structure is static. The first feature rules out unbounded-
velocity systems, while the second guarantees there are no singularities in spacetime. Given 
these two features, global existence and uniqueness theorems can be proven for cases like 
source-free electromagnetic fields so that unique evolution is not violated when appropriate 
initial data are specified on a space- like hypersurface. Unfortunately, when electromagnetic 
sources or gravitationally interacting particles are added to the picture, the status of unique 
evolution becomes much less clear. 
 In contrast, general relativity presents problems for guaranteeing unique evolution. 
For example, there are spacetimes for which there are no appropriate specifications of initial 
data on space- like hypersurfaces yielding global existence and uniqueness theorems. In such 
spacetimes, unique evolution is easily violated. Furthermore, problems for unique evolution 
arise from the possibility of naked singularities (singularities not hidden behind an event 
horizon). One way a singularity might form is from gravitational collapse. The usual model 
for such a process involves the formation of an event horizon (i.e., a black hole). Although a 
black hole has a singularity inside the event horizon, outside the horizon at least determinism 
is okay, provided the spacetime supports appropriate specifications of initial data compatible 
with unique evolution. In contrast, a naked singularity has no event horizon. The problem 
here is that anything at all could pop out of a naked singularity, violating unique evolution. 
To date, no general, convincing forms of hypotheses ruling out such singularities have been 
proven (so-called cosmic censorship hypotheses). 
 
Determinism in Quantum Mechanics 
In contrast to classical mechanics philosophers often take quantum mechanics to be an 
indeterministic theory. Nevertheless, so-called pilot-wave theories pioneered by Louis de 
Broglie and David Bohm are explicitly deterministic while still agreeing with experiments. 
Roughly speaking, this family of theories treats a quantum system as consisting of both a 
  
wave and a particle. The wave evolves deterministically over time according to the 
Schrödinger equation and determines the motion of the particle. Hence, the particle’s motion 
satisfies unique evolution. This is a perfectly coherent view of quantum mechanics and 
contrasts strongly with the more orthodox interpretation. The latter takes the wave to evolve 
deterministically according to Schrödinger’s equation and treats particle- like phenomena 
indeterministically in a measurement process (such processes typically violate unique 
evolution because the particle system can be in the same state before measurement, but still 
yield many different outcomes after measurement). Pilot-wave theories show that quantum 
mechanics need not be indeterministic. 
 
Deterministic Chaos 
Some philosophers have thought that the phenomenon of deterministic chaos–the extreme 
sensitivity of a variety of classical mechanics systems such that roughly even the smallest 
change in initial conditions can lead to vastly different evolutions in state space–might 
actually show that classical mechanics is not deterministic. However, there is no real 
challenge to unique evolution here as each history of state transitions in state space is still 
unique to each slightly different initial condition. 
 Of course, classical chaotic systems are typically considered as if there is no such 
thing as quantum mechanics. But suppose one considers a combined system such that 
quantum mechanics is the source of the small changes in initial conditions for one’s classical 
chaotic system? Would such a system fail to satisfy unique evolution? The worry here is that 
since there is no known lower limit to the sensitivity of classical chaotic systems, nothing can 
prevent the possibility of such systems amplifying a slight change in initial conditions due to 
a quantum event so that the evolution of the classical chaotic system is dramatically different 
than if the quantum event had not taken place. Indeed, some philosophers argue that unique 
evolution must fail in such circumstances. 
 However, such sensitivity arguments depend crucially on how quantum mechanics 
itself and measurements are interpreted as well as on where the cut is made distinguishing 
between what is observed and what is doing the observing (e.g., is the classical chaotic 
system serving as the measuring device for the quantum change in initial conditions?). 
Although considered abstractly, sensitivity arguments do correctly lead to the conclusion that 
quantum effects can be amplified by classical chaotic systems; they do not automatically 
render one’s classical plus quantum system indeterministic. Furthermore, applying such 
arguments to concrete physical systems shows that the amplification process may be severely 
constrained. For example investigating the role of quantum effects in the process of chaos in 
the friction of sliding surfaces indicates that quantum effects might be amplified by chaos to 
produce a difference in macroscopic behavior only if the fluctuations are large enough to 
break molecular bonds and are amplified quickly enough. 
 
Broader Implications  
Finally, what of broader implications of determinism and indeterminism in physical theories? 
Debates about free will and determinism are one place where the considerations in this entry 
might be relevant. One of the most discussed topics in this regard is the consequence 
argument, which may be put informally as follows: If determinism is true, then a person’s 
acts are consequences of laws and events in the remote past. But what went on before a 
person was born is not up to the person and neither are the laws. Therefore, the consequences 
of these laws and events–including a person’s present acts–are not up to the person. Whether 
  
or not the relevant laws satisfy unique evolution is one factor in the evaluation of this 
argument. 
 What of broader philosophical thinking about psychological determinism or the thesis 
that the universe is deterministic? For the former, it looks difficult to make any connection at 
all. One simply does not have any theories in the behavioral sciences that are amenable to 
analysis under the criterion of unique evolution. Indeed, attempts to apply the criterion in 
psychology do not lead to clarification of the crucial issues (Bishop 2002). 
 With regards to the universe, it has been common practice since the seventeenth 
century for philosophers to look to their best scientific theories as guides to the truth of 
determinism. As we have seen, our current best theories in physics are remarkably unclear 
about the truth of determinism in the physical sciences, so the current guides do not appear to 
be so helpful. Even if the best theories were clear on the matter of determinism in their 
province, there is a further problem awaiting their application to metaphysical questions 
about the universe as a whole. Recall the crucial faithful model assumption. In many contexts 
this assumption is fairly unproblematic. However, if the system in question is nonlinear–that 
is to say, has the property that a small change in the state or conditions of the system is not 
guaranteed to result in a small change in the system’s behavior–this assumption faces serious 
difficulties (indeed, a strongly idealized version of the assumption, the perfect model scenario 
is needed but also runs into difficulties regarding drawing conclusions about the systems one 
is modeling). Since the universe is populated with such systems–indeed, it is likely to be 
nonlinear itself–one’s purchase on applying our best laws and theories to such systems or the 
universe as a whole to answer the large metaphysical question about determinism is quite 
problematic. 
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